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The primary intent of this research is to investigate
and describe the involvement of Martin Luther King/ Jr.'s
opposition to the war in Vietnam and the critical responses
that followed. King's speaking out against the Vietnam
conflict was not spontaneous; he deliberated two years
before doing so. As early as 1965/ he made mention of the
war but because of criticisms from senior officials in the
Civil Rights Movement/ he postponed his efforts to join in
"peace-rallies" and "teach-ins." On April 4, 1967/ one year
before he was assassinated/ he gave his "Beyond Vietnam"
speech that outlined his position on the war.
Criticisms were many and severe/ ranging from some of
his closest associates of the Johnson Administration;
but King maintained his posture of opposing the war. As a
matter of fact/ on February 4/ 1968/ two months before his
death/ he emphatically declared/ "We're criminals in that
war!" A brief review of the United States' participation
in the war and of King's philosophy will help to illuminate
King's opposition. The research has not found any published
books that deal directly with King's involvement in the
Vietnam crisis. However new information is added to the
subject-matter through interviews and. with correspondence
from King's contemporaries.
General works on King which reflect on aspects of the
research are: My Life With Martin Luther King, Jr. by
Coretta Scott King, King: A Biography by David L. Lewis,
Let the Trumpet Sound by Stephen Oates and The FBI and
Martin Luther King, Jr. by David Garrow.
The research points out that King's involvement in
Vietnam was based on moral, religious, and philosophical
convictions that the war was "a senseless, unjust and evil
war." The research also proposes that King was prophetic in
that he voiced opposition to the war which later would become
a popular view.
The bulk of research information came from King's
speeches and writings, personal papers, major newspapers and
magazines, scholarly journals, books and oral interviews with
King's associates and contemporaries, such as Hosea Williams,
George Weaver, Floyd McKissick, C.T. Vivian and Tom Offen-
burger. Some of the primary sources used are King's Trumpet
of Conscience, Strength to Love, Where Do We Go from Here:
Chaos or Community?, "Beyond Vietnam" (speech), "Why I Am
Opposed to the War in Vietnam" (speech).
The gathering of information was carried out in the
Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Nonviolent Social Change,
the Woodruff libraries of Atlanta University and Emory
University, and the public library.
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KING AND THE VIETNAM WAR - AN INTRODUCTION
If North Vietnam is communist today, we
have ourselves to blame. If they are
alienated from America and American
ideals we have ourselves to blame. For
we rejected their appeal for friendship
and understanding.
- Martin Luther King,. Jr. to Sam Wyler,
July 20, 1967
The primary intent of this research is to investigate
and analyze the involvement of Martin Luther King, Jr.'s
opposition to the war in Vietnam and the critical responses
that followed. King's speaking out against the Vietnam
conflict was not spontaneous; he deliberated two years
before doing so. As early as 1965, he made mention of the
war but because of criticisms from senior officials in the
Civil Rights Movement, he postponed his efforts to join in
"peace-rallies" and "teach-ins." On April 4, 1967, one year
before he was assassinated, he gave his "Beyond Vietnam"
speech that outlined his position on the war.
Criticisms were many and severe, ranging from some of
his closest associates to that of the Johnson Administration;
but King maintained his posture of opposing the war. As a
matter of fact, on February 4, 1968, two months before his
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death, he emphatically declared, "We're criminals in that
war!"- A brief review of the United States' participation
in the war and of King's philosophy will help to illuminate
King's opposition.
Before World War I, Vietnam was considered a part of
the French Colonial Empire in Indochina. During the war,
Vietnam was occupied by the Japanese. At the Potsdam
Conference, Allied plans called for the occupation of this
country after the defeat of Japan. British forces would
occupy the southern half (Cochin China or Nam Viet) and
China, the northern half (Tonkin or Bac Viet) to gather
and disarm the Japanese and rescue Allied prisoners.
When the war ended, France sought to reestablish its
prewar status. However, when French officials and troops
returned to Indochina, the political situation in Vietnam
had changed. Ho Chi Minh, head of the League for the
Independence of Vietnam (Viet Minh) who fought against the
Japanese in guerrilla warfare, had liberated Hanoi and
established the independent Republic of Vietnam. He sought
aid from the United States on two occasions, but his
requests went unanswered. Above all, he wanted his hew
government recognized by the Allied nations; but this did not
happen.
France proposed that North Vietnam be incorporated
into a "free state" within the French Union and that South
Vietnam be temporarily divided from North Vietnam. Ho
accepted this plan basically for two reasons. First, he
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felt his forces could not defeat the French; and second/ he
was under the impression that France would abandon its
colonial policy as did Britain in Asia. However/ with the
New Constitution of France/ Ho's dream of a peaceful united
Vietnam turned into a reality of war that lasted three
continuous decades.
In June of 1946/ France made it known that it had no
intentions of allowing South Vietnam to join North Vietnam
because of its economic interest in the region. A puppet
state was set up in the South and was declared a free
republic. In October of the same year/ all of Vietnam was
considered an "associate state" and denied any local
autonomy. Ho was betrayed and fighting between the French
and Vietminh began.^
Until the end of 1949/ the United States had little
interest in Indochina. As a matter of fact/ the United
States urged France to grant the Vietnamese independence
but no pressure was applied. France was needed in the
formation of the European Defense Community (EDC) which was
the United States highest objective during the post-war years.
Major support came from the United States to France
when communist rule was established in China by Mao Tse Tung.
The Trioman administration sought to contain communism/ which
^Thomas F. Eagleton/ War and Presidential Powers; A
Chronicle of Congressional Surrender (New York; Liveright
Publishing Co./ 1974)/ pp. 80-82.
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the French said they were doing in Vietnam. Therefore, in
the case of the United States' selection between supporting
colonialism and preventing a communist takeover, the pros of
former far outweighed the cons of the latter. During the
same time, the Triiman administration supported Bao Dai, who
was once the French-controlled emperor of Central Vietnam
(Annam), to compete with Ho for the allegiance of the
Vietnamese nationalists. Then, in February of 1950, the
United States recognized the independence of South Vietnam
and supported it economically and militarily.
The United States government provided to South Vietnam
$150 million in 1950, which rose to $1 billion in 1954.
By this time, it was underwriting eighty percent of the war
cost of which $800 million was allocated directly to the
French Union Forces; $300 million for equipment; and $33
million was for economic and technical assistance. Despite
the tremendous amount of aid from the United States, France
lost the war.
To officially end the war, a conference was called at
Geneva in 1954. Its essential features were: the establish¬
ment of a provisional military demarcation line at the 17th
parallel general elections to bring about the unification
of Vietnam; the banning of the introduction into the whole
of Vietnam of any troop reinforcement and additional
military personnel from the outside; the banning of the
introduction into Vietnam of any reinforcements in the
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forms of all types of arms, munitions and other war materials,
such as combat aircraft, naval craft, pieces of ordnance,
jet engines and jet weapons, and armoured vehicles. The
overseer of the Geneva Conference was the International
Control Commission (ICC-) which was composed of representatives
of Canada, India, and Poland.
The Final Declaration was signed by the representatives
of the United Kingdom, China, the Soviet Union, Cambodia,
Laos, France, and the Vietminh, but the United States and
South Vietnam refused to give oral or written declaration
of the Geneva Agreements. The United States issued its own
unilateral declaration: "In the case of nations now divided
against their will, we shall continued to seek to achieve
unity through free elections, supervised by the United
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Nations to insure that they are conducted fairly." The
United States did not sign the agreements because, in the
words,of Secretary State John Foster Dulles, "America public
opinion would never tolerate the guarantee of the subjection
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of millions of Vietnamese to communist rule." Therefore,
the Geneva Agreements were not binding as far as the United
States or South Vietnam was concerend. The United States,
instead, established the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
(SEATO) to prevent the spread of communism in Indochina;,
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George McTurnan Kahin and John W. Lewis, The United
States in Vietnam (New York: The Dial Press Publishing





In 1955/ after Ho Chi Minh wanted to begin election
procedures in accordance with the Geneva Conference, Prime
Minister Ngo Dinh Diem, the new president of South Vietnam
who was appointed by Bao Dai, refused to cooperate. He
declared, "We have not signed the Geneva Agreements. We
are not bound in any way by these agreements, signed
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against the will of the Viet-Namese people." He was
totally backed by the United States.
Diem began getting rid of all opposition by placing
his enemies in political prisons/ concentration camps, and
re-education centers. He made it a capital offense to work
with any group or organization declared as "communist."
Because of his unpopularity, insurrection groups formed,
such as the South Vietminh (those who fought against the
French), the National Salvation Front, an anti-communist
group, and the National Liberation Front (Vietnamese
Communists who desired having North and South Vietnam
united. They were known as the Viet Cong). South Vietnam's
insurrection was rooted in conditions which existed within
itself which was contrary to United States policy assumption
that the revival of the civil war was instigated by North
Vietnam.
After the ovethrow of Diem by assassination, the




Van Minh/ the new head of government/ advocating a policy
of neutrality. But "Washington did not envisage neutralism
for the country/" and President Lyndon Johnson stated/
Neutralization of South Vietnam would only
be another name for a Communist takeover
...The United States will continue to
furnish you and your people with the
fullest measure of support in this bitter
fight...we shall maintain.in Vietnam
American personnel and material as needed
to assist you in achieving victory.^
On the night of August 2, 1964/ North Vietnamese torpedo
boats launched an unprovoked attack on the United States
destroyer Maddox/ according to the official United States
version. Hanoi admitted the attack/ but insisted that it
was done in retaliation for the United States bombardments
of nearby North Vietnamese islands. This confrontation is
known as the First Gulf of Tonkin incident.
On August 4/ the Second Gulf of Tonkin'incident took
place. North Vietnam torpedo boats launched an attack on
two United States destroyers: the Maddox and the Turner Joy.
However/ Hanoi denied the reports.
The following day/ Johnson addressed congress to
approve action necessary to assist nations which were
covered by SEATO. The resolution passed 414-0 in the House
and 88-2 in the Senate. After several more military engage¬
ments/ on March 2, 1965/ American bombers attacked North




The United States did not examine carefully its internal
conditions which would affect its participation in the war.
Nor did it apparently recognize the right of the Vietnamese
to exercise' self-determination.
In 1954, the year the Vietnamese defeated the French,
Martin Luther King, Jr., at the age of twenty-five, had
finished his residential requirements for his doctorate
at Boston University and subsequently moved to Montgomery,
Alabama, where he led a nonviolent movement to desegregate
the bus lines of the city. This occurred in December of
1955 and lasted 381.days.
Up to that time although King was a minister by trade,
he, ironically, found it hard to accept Jesus' turn-the-
other-cheek and love-your-enemies philosophy as a means of
eradicating social injustices; he thought it was sound only
when individuals were at odds with other individuals. He
0
opined, "a more realistic approach is necessary." However,
when he studied the Gandhian method of non-violence, he
synthesized it with the Christian doctrine of love and
considered it "the most potent weapon available to an
oppressed people in their struggle for freedom." He,
0Martin Luther King,.Jr., Strength to Love (Cleveland:
William Collins and World Publishing, Co., 1963), pp. 150-
151. This sentiment was also expressed in Martin Luther
King, Jr., Stride Toward Freedom: The Montgomery Story
(New York; Harper and Row Publishers, 1958), pp. 96-97.
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nonetheless, acquired only an intellectual understanding of
the Christian-Gandhian philosophy and had no idea that it
would be used practically. Said he, "I had no firm
determination to organize it in a socially effective
7
situation."
But with his success in Montgomery, King was hailed
nationally and internationally as an exponent of the non¬
violent philosophy, and the power and effectiveness of non¬
violence was lifted from the depth of intellectualism to the
height of "commitment as a way of life." From 1954 to 1967,
he was preaching the social gospel of civil rights, but when
he began challenging the foreign policy of the United States
in Vietnam, he had broaden his socio-religious ministry to
include human rights. He felt that the war in Vietnam was
evil, and thus, he had to speak out against it because the.
war was', antithical to his principles of love, justice, truth,
and peace.
King was one of the earliest, prominent blacks to
denounce the United States' involvement in Southeast Asia.
Although nonviolence was a major part of his philosophy, he
was not opposing the war specifically on the grounds of the
nonviolent philosophy. He opposed the war because of his
"total philosophy" as a Christian minister, his unique love
[agape] for all mankind, and his ultimate desire for better
human relations and world peace.
^Ibid., p. 151.
CHAPTER II
KING’S OPPOSITION TO THE WAR IN VIETNAM
On some positions, cowardice asks the
question, is it safe? Expediency asks
the question, is it politic? Vanity asks
the question, is it right? There comes a
time when one must take a stand that is
neither safe, nor politic, nor popular,
but he must take it because it is right.
- Martin Luther King, Jr. to Sam Wyler,
July 20, 1967
Dr. King?s position on war as an instriament of inter¬
national relations was not always firmly fixed. In 1951 as
a student at Crozer Seminary, Chester, Pennsylvania, King
stated that he was not a doctrinaire or absolute pacifist.
He explained that a votary of nonviolence does not reject
violence totally but a doctrinaire pacifist does. He gave
as an example that the latter does not even believe in the
maintaining of a police force "since there is no real
difference in kind between war and police action," wherein
the former asserts that there must be some coercion to keep
one man from injuring his associates.^ King, however, sought
to embrace a realistic position which held pacificism as the
^Martin Luther King, Jr., "War and Pacifism, 1951,"
Martin Luther King, Jr. Papers, Box 1, User's copy, Martin
Luther King, Jr. Center for Nonviolent Social Change,




lesser evil in the circumstances of war. He did recognize
war as an element to avert totalitarian systems; however,
with the destruction associated with modern warfare which
could result in universal annihalation. King postulated that
man did not have a choice between violence and nonviolence;
I
rather, that man had a choice between nonviolence and non¬
existence . ^
By the early 1960s, King had not only firmly developed
a theory, but had also practiced his philosophical pursuits
of nonviolence. He condemned nuclear testing in public
addresses, writings, and numerous signed statements at a
time when it was "unpopular" to do so. In 1959 he stated,
"I have unequivocally declared my hatred for this most
colossal of all evils [war] and I have condemned any
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organizer of war, regardless of his rank and nationality."
He further emphasized his quest for peace the day after
receiving the Nobel Peace Prize in 1964, "It is as imperative
and urgent to put an end to war and violence between nations
as it is to put an end to racial injustice."^ He reiterated
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Martin Luther King, Jr., Strength to Love (Cleveland;
Collins Publishers, 1963), p. 153.
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Ibid., pp. 95, 153. See also Martin Luther King, Jr.,
Stride Toward Freedom; The Montgomery Story (New York;
Harper and Row Publishers, 1958), p. 224.
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Robert Williams, Negroes with Guns (Chicago; Third
World Press, 1962), p. 15.
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Martin Luther King, Jr., The Quest for Peace and
Justice," 11 December 1964, MLK Papers, Box 7, User's copy.
Hereafter user's copy will be quoted as U.C.
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the same sentiments at the Southern Christian Leadership
0
Conference (SCLC) Convention in Birmingham/ Alabama.
King's first pl\ange into the Vietnam affair occurred
when he issued a statement in Washington/ D.C. on March 6,
1965/ that the American government should follow the course
of a negotiated settlement in the Vietnam crisis. He argued
that the interested parties - China/ the Vietcong (Viet¬
namese Communist/ the NLF - National Liberation Front)/
South Vietnam/ the United States/ and Russia - should work
out their problems through the auspices/ sponsbrship/ and
.7
authority of the United Nations. As the international
agency for solving world problems/ he saw the United Nations
as the instrument in providing a non-violent solution to the
conflict.
In early April in a SCLC Board of Director's meeting/
Andrew Young/ Executive Director/ made reference that
oppressed people of the world looked to King as a peace-maker
and that people of the North/ London/ South Africa/ and
Vietnam wanted him to come and help with their problems.
King said that the matter would be taken up further in the
meeting/ but no more was said about London/ South Africa/ ■
^Martin Luther King/ Jr,, "Statement to SCLC Convention/"
12 August 1965/ MLK Papers/.Box 9/.U.C..
7
Martin Luther King/ Jr,, "Statement on Vietnam,"
6 March 1965/ MLK Papers/ Box 8/ U.C.; CBS/ "Face the
Nation/" 29 August 1965/ MLK Papers/ Box 9, TJ.C.
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or Vietnam.^ Later that month, April 22, the day a civil
rights march was to take place in Boston, King said that
peace and human rights are inseparable.
One cannot be concerned just with civil
rights...It is nice to drink milk at an
unsegregated lunch coimter - but not
when there'S' strontium 90 in it...I
have no objections to civil rights
leaders speaking out against war as
against segregation.^
In June of 1965, after a speech to the SCLC's Summer
Community Organization and Political Education (SCOPE) at
Morris Bro'wn College, Atlanta, Georgia, King was questioned
as to whether nonviolence could be effectively applied to
Vietnam and world peace. He answered in the affirmative
by asserting that the believers of nonviolence could pressure
nations to bring about disarmament. .And, to stop the war’in
Vietnam, he opined that America "must experiment with the
nonviolent method in international dimensions
In his well-known work. Stride Toward Freedom, 1958,
King also explained that a basic aspect of the nonviolent
philosophy is not to humiliate, mortify or repulse the enemy
but to win his friendship and understanding.^^ Placing this
^"SCLC -Board Meetings, 1-2 April 1965," MLK Papers,
Box 29.
9
"New Tack for Dr. King: Broader Issues, Wider Goals,"
U.S. News and World Report 58 (Mar 1965), p. 18.
^*^Martin Luther King, Jr., "Speech to the Southern
Christian Leadership Conference's Summer Community Organiza¬
tion and Political Education (SCOPE)," 15 June 1965, MLK
Papers, Box 8, U.C.
^^M.L. King, Jr., Stride Toward Freedom, p. 102.
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aspect of the philosophy on an international plane, on July
2, 1965, he again emphasized his opposition to the actions
of the United States in Vietnam. This time, however, his
opposition was done publicly and firmly. It was at -a rally
sponsored by the Virginia branch of the SCLC that King
declared, "I'm not going to sit by and see war escalate
without saying anything about it.” The war in Vietnam
"must be stopped. It must be a negotiated settlement. We
must even negotiate with the Vietcong...We're not going to
. . 12defeat Communism with bombs and gases." King's involve¬
ment in the Vietnam crisis brought him into conflict with
James Farmer of the Congress on Racial Equality (CORE) and
Roy Wilkins of the National■Association for the Advancement
of Colored People (NAACP).^^
On August 10, 1965, during the Board of Directors
meeting at SCLC's Annual Convention in Birmingham, Alabama,
there was a discussion concerning where and how to expand
SCLC, and it was in this connection that Young again made
a statement that a leader of King's status was expected by
the world to focus on peace and brotherhood. He made it
clear that King would make reference to letters which he
intended to send to the'heads of State to negotiate a’ peace
12 . . .
"Civil Rights and War," New York Times, 3 July 1965,
sec. 1, p. 6; "King Proposes U.S. Negotiate Viet War,'"
Atlanta Constitution. 3 July 1965, sec. 1, p. 2.
13
"Is Vietnam to Become a 'Civil Rights' Issue?," u.s.
News and World Report 59 (July 1965), p. 12.
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settlement in Vietnam.Benjamin Hooks, attorney, questioned
the matter of King's calling for a negotiated settlement,
arguing that it went too far in the international arena.
King, however, disagreed. As the meeting continued, two
motions were made. In one, it was resolved that the question
of whether or not King should express concern about the peace
question be turned over to the Resolutions Committee to be
included in Resolutions of Conventions; and secondly, a
member move to establish a commission to study the applica¬
bility of nonviolence in international affairs. The first
motion was carried; however, the second was tabled for
further discussion. During the discussion of the second
motion, Joseph Lowery, second Vice-President, stated, "I
don't think SCLC is structured to go into this kind of
complex, difficult, confusing area. I support that part of
supporting you [King] in Vietnam, but don't support that part
which takes SCLC into investigative...[sic]" Ronald Smith,
another member, also added that SCLC did not have the resources
15
and staff to enter into such an area of world conflict.
^^"SCLC - Board Meetings, 10 August 1965," MLK Papers,
Box 29.
15 . . . .
Ibid. According to David Lewis, author of King; A
Biography, the Board of SCLC voted that if King were to speak
against the war, he had to do so as a clergyman and as a
private citizen. Louise Cook, Director of the Martin Luther
King, Jr. Center for Nonviolent Social Change Library and
Archives, interviewed in Atlanta,' May 8, 1985 stated that
there is no documentary evidence to support exactly what
transpired at the board meeting and whether in fact there was
a vote taken by the board. She did say, however, that Hosea
Williams, one of King's aides, told David Garrow, author of
The FBI and Martin Luther King, Jr. that there was a vote
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According to Adam Fairclough's "Martin Luther King, Jr.
and the War in Vietnam," to avoid a split in SCLC, Baynard
Rustin, Director of the A. Philip Randolph Institute, framed
the following resolution;
We must still.affirm that the primary function
of our organization is to secure full citizen¬
ship rights for the Negro citizens of this
country... Our resources are not sufficient to
assiome that burden of two major issues...We
would therefore urge that the efforts of SCLC
in mass demonstrations and action movements
be confined to the question of racial brother¬
hood . 16
Some controversy surrounded the interpretation of this
resolution. "By adopting this resolution" writes Fairclough,
"the convention disassociated itself from King's position on
the war." However, disassociation appears to be too strong
a wording because the remaining part of the resolution stated
In the event of perilous escalation of the
Vietnam conflict we [delegates] respect the
right of Dr. King and the administrative
committee to alter this course [the function
of the organization] and turn the full
resources of our organization to the cessation
to the bloodshed and war.l^
If there had been a potential split, both sides would
have had to be appeased to prevent it, those who opposed
taken. And, for the first and only time ever, the board
(including MLK, Sr.) voted against King. King wanted SCLC
to go on record to condemn the war.
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Adam Fairclough, "Martin Luther King, Jr. and the
War in Vietnam," Phylon 45:1 (March 1984),:24-26.
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"Summary of Ninth Annual Convention, SC.C, 9-13
August 1965," MLK Papers, Box 29; "Dr. King May Make a
Wider Peace Bid," New York Times, 14 August 1966, sec. 1,
p. 3.
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King's stand and those who were in favor of it. The resolu¬
tions, rather than disassociating SCLC from King, attempted
to reconcile whatever differences that may have occurred.
Moreover, according to Reverend C.T. Vivian, Director of
Affiliates, interviewed in Atlanta, Georgia on March 18,
1985 said.
To say that there was a division in the rank
of SCLC is nonsense. There has never been a
division in the rank of SCLC. What Dr. King
wanted, we [SCLC] wanted. If there were over
two people in our whole broad meeting that
even thought there was something wrong with
Martin's position, its only because they
figured somebody [liberals] may get upset.
The basic concern, continued Vivian was Rustin's "worry
about public relations." In fact, the end of the resolution
, . 19
said, "Do what you want to do Martin." This is not to say,
however, that there was not continuing opposition from some
20
of the board members.
In his presidential address, after the board meeting.
King indicated that the war grieved him so much that his
conscience impelled him to speak out. He did not place
blame on America or Vietnam; the war was such a complex
situation that he placed the blame on war itself, a position
from which he drastically changed in 1967. To end the war,
he stipulated specifically what could be done;
18 Interview with Reverend C.T. Vivian,





SCLC's support will be discussed in the next chapter.
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1. The United States;, should .effect a new
diplomatic machinery without giving the
impression of appeasement.
2. The United States should bring to a halt
the bombings in North Vietnam.
3. Ho Chi Minh and Chou En-lai must alter
their demand of the unilateral with¬
drawal of American forces from South
Vietnam.
4. Negotiations shall be opened with the
National Liberation Front (NLF).^^
In protesting the war/ King sooner or later had to
question the judicious understanding of President Lyndon
, . 22
Johnson's foreign policy. In early September 1965/ Johnson
requested that King withhold his statements and talk to
Ambassador Arthur Goldberg of the United Nations about the
situation in Vietnam. On September 10/ desperately wanting
the war to end because of the sufferings of the Vietnamese
and Americans and to head off a war which could possibly
23
destroy mankind/ King met with Ambassador Goldberg.
The meeting was called for New York. King/ along with
Young/ Harry Wachtel/ member of the Research Committee of the
SCLC/ Rustin/ and Bernard Lee/ an aid to King/ met with
Goldberg and reiterated the points he had made at the
convention and added that China should be allowed to become
a member of the United Nations. King believed that the
21 .
M.L. King/ Jr., "Statement to SCLC Convention/ 12
August 1965/" MLK Papers/ Box 9, U.C. and "MLK and Goldberg
of the United Nations/" MLK Papers/ Box 9, U.C.
22 . .
James Haskings/ The Life and Death of Martin Luther
King/ Jr. (New York; Lothrop/ Lee and Shepard Publishers/
1977)/ p. 97.
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David Lewis/ King; A Biography (Chicago: University
of Illinois PresS/ 1975)/ p. 305; Stephen B. Oates/ Let the
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acceptance of China -would ease tension in Southeast Asia and
make disarmament possible. And, he could not see how there
could be a United Nations without the largest country in the
world in it. Goldberg told King that the United States was
in favor of peace and that a resolution of the- war could be
24
expected soon. The talks were apiicable, but Goldberg had
also stated.that the U.S. would, not be forced out of Vietnam
and that it would stay as long as it took to assist South
. . . . . 25
Vietnam to maintain its o-wn independence.
King, in an interview on CBS, August 29, 1965 intended
to send the letters to the heads of State to enter into a
conference to bring about the war's abrogation through
negotiation, but he was so busy with the movement in Los
Angeles (Watts) that he did not have time to do so. The
New York Times maintained that King dropped the issue of-
sending the letters because of the Logan Act (this act
prevents a private citizen from dealing with a foreign
Trumpet Sound; The Life of Martin Luther King, Jr. (New York
Harper and Row Publishers, 1983), p. 380.
24
"Dr. King Urges U.S. to Press for Seat for Peking in
the United Nations," New York Times, 11 September 1965, sec.
1, p. 9; "King Bids Johnson Tour Ghettos," New York World
Telegram, Newspaper Articles, August-September, 1965," MLK
Papers, Box 18.
25
"MLK and Goldberg of the United Nations," MLK Papers,
Box 9, U.C.
Interview on CBS, "Face the Nation," 29 August 1965,
MLK Papers, Box 9, U.C.
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government). King made it plain, nevertheless, that he had
no desire to negotiate, for certainly he did not have the
political expertise in international relations. Another
reason why he changed his mind was because of the revitali¬
zation of the United Nations and its potential as an
. . . . 29
international conciliator. According to the FBI files,
in a conference phone call on September 28, 1965 to Young and
others stated, "I don't mind being a minority of one...but
I am mindful of the criticism I have been taken...I am
convinced that the press is being stacked against me." He
further declared:
I really don't have the strength to fight this
issue and keep my civil rights fight. They have
all the news media and TV, and I just don't
have the strength to fight all these things...!
may feel a sense of guilt about the civil rights
movement because this would take too much of my
time...and I feel that I couldn't get the backing
of the civil rights leaders on my position such
as Roy Wilkins and Whitney Young...I feel that Ho
Cho Minh and Chou En-Lai are not going to respond
affirmatively regarding these letters and that
will make me look worse, so I have to find out
how I can gracefully pull out so that I can get
on with the civil rights issue.30
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Vietnam Pullout," New York Times, 14 April 1966, sec. 1, p. 6.
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"Statement: Vietnam," 13 August 1965, MLK Papers,
Box 9, U.C.
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"Press Release, Taliafero County, Georgia," 6 October
1965, MLK Papers, Box 9, U.C.
30
M.L. King, Jr., "Conference Call to Stanley Levison, Bay
nard Rustin, Andy Young, John Barber and Harry Wachtel, 28 Sept
ember 1965, FBI Files New’York, 100-111180-9-71a. Between 1963
and 1968, the FBI had wire taps on and listened in on many of
King's calls. Since the passage of the Freedom of Information
Act, these recorded conversations have been released by the
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Nevertheless, before the conference was over. King changed
his mind about getting out of the Vietnam controversy al¬
together and felt that he needed only to withdraw temporarily.
In the latter part of 1965, and most of 1966, King did
not stress the issue of Vietnam because of SCLC's venture in
the North and the criticism he received from the press and
civil rights leaders. In principle, he did continue talcing
a stand against the war but with a low profile. Charles
Pager of the Christian Century uniquely summarized King's
dilemma in 1966: "At present. Dr. King seems to be trying
to walk a tortuous middle path. Opposing the war as a matter
31
of form but doing so as quietly as possible." Looking back
on the situation Floyd McKissick,.former director of CORE,
interviewed in Oxford, North Carolina, March 7, 1985 stated
that King, as the strongest black leader in the nation, was
torn between when to express his opposition and when not to
FBI. References to FBI record in this paper is based on a
review of that section of the files which pertains to
criticisms of the Vietnam war. Although there is a main file
on King, much of the information comes from the files of
Stanley Levison, once a known communist, an attorney who
volunteered his services to SCLC. Thus, the FBI surmised
that there was communist influence on King and SCLC. For
further information on Levison and wire on King, see David
Garrow, The FBI and Martin Luther King, Jr. from "Solo" to
Memphis (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1981).
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Charles E. Fager, "Dilemma for Dr. King," Christian
Century 83 (March 1966), p. 332. In October and December of
1965, King spoke to the Women's International League for
Peace and Freedom and the Synagogue Council of America,
respectively. These speeches were addressing international
peace issues generally rather than Vietnam specifically.
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do so. The question was one of timing. He was very much
conscious that members of the peace movement wanted more
involvement from him. However, some blacks who feared that
King's opposition would antagonize the Democrats did not
want him to speak out because of the fear that it would
32
endanger the Civil Rights program. Nonetheless, on April
18, 1966, on the National Broadcasting Company morning "Today
Show," King reiterated his peace plan for the U.S. to develop
a new diplomatic machinery and stop the bombings. Four days
later he issued a statement in Chicago, Illinois, that he
did plan to intensify his personal activities against the
war. He stated that it should cease
because the war is hurting us in all of our
programs to end slums and to end segregation
and to make quality education a reality and
to end the long night of poverty. The fact is
that when a nation becomes obsessed with the
guns of war, domestic programs are left behind
and we need a radical re-ordering of our
national priorities. It seems to me that we
are more concerned as a nation about winning
the war in Vietnam than we are about winning
the war against poverty right here at home.^^
More than a month later on Columbia Broadcasting's "Face the
Nation," May 29, 1966, he said, "Because of my concern for
the survival of mankind...! must take a stand against the
. . 34
constant escalation of this war." Although King participated
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in issues which dealt with the Vietnam crisis in 1966,
he never came out as strongly against the war as he had in
1965.
Between December 1966 and February 1967, King contem¬
plated the would-be effects of his opposition to the war,
and thought about the criiticisms, abuses, and the increased
threats on his life. Thus, it is evident that he did not
spontaneously decide to speak out in early 1967. He
confessed,
I did't rush to do it. I didn't just
decide to do it on a moment's notice.
I had.my own vacillations and I asked
questions of whether on the one hand I
should do it or whether or I shouldn't...!
was prepared for everything that came.^^
King decided to go against the tide of public opinion,
including that of civil rights leaders, to further denounce
the war. He knew that blacks were dying in disproportiate
numbers; he knew that war had escalated in spite of.Goldberg's
assurance that peace was close at hand; he knew of the
Vietnam casualties; he knew there were those who contended
35
On January 16, 1966, King preached the sermon, "Con¬
formity Thought, Non-Conformist - Julian Bond." King spoke
of Rep. Julian Bond's continuing stand against the war. Bond
was voted, almost unanimously, to be unseated by the State of
Georgia Legistlature! because -of his anti-rwar views. King, gpoke
before the Senate Subcommittee of Executive Reorganization
where he criticized the U.S. government for its huge expendi¬
tures in Vietnam and warned that America needs, a rebalancing
of priorities. See "Dr. King Scores Poverty Budget," New York
Times, 16 December 1966, sec. 1, p. 33.
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that he could not be silent on the war issue; but his
decision to join the voices of dissent came when he picked
up an article entitled, "The Children of Vietnam.” He was on
his way to Jamaica to write the.last chapter of Where Do We '
Go from Here: Chaos or Community? when he stopped at a
restaurant before boarding the plane. According to Mark
Lane and Dick Gregory, Lee reported that he.and Dr. King had .
both'ordered dinner, and that during this wait. Dr. King
picked up an armload of current magazines. The food arrived
and both men began to eat.
While"he ate. Dr. King looked through the
magazines...When he came to Ramparts Magazine
he stopped. He froze as he looked at the
pictures from Vietnam. He saw a picture of a
Vietnamese mother holding her dead baby, a
baby killed by our military. Then Martin just
pushed the plate of food away from him. I
looked up and said 'Doesn't it taste any good?'
and he answered, 'Nothing will ever taste any
good for me until I do everything I can to end
that war.' That's when the decision was made.^®
The incident caused King to step up his tempo to
challenge the Administration's foreign policy. He was seeming¬
ly at a point of.no return. If he were to continue speaking,
out against the war, a possibility existed of even dividing
the Civil Rights Movement, and there was a danger of losing
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the much needed support from the Johnson administration and
liberal whites. Yet, he decided he would vigorously oppose
the war. Perhaps he was saying, in substance, what he told
the SCLC gathering at a retreat in South Carolina in 1967:
I backed up a little when I came out in
1965. My name then wouldn't have been
written in any book called. Profiles of
Courage. But now I have decided. I will
not be intimidated. I will not be harrassed.
I will not be silent and I will be heard.
After his trip to Jamaica, King spoke to a group of
black teachers in Atlanta. He asserted;
We [civil rights activists, in-SCLC] don't
intend to let up one iota in our battle
against racism...But the problems of guns
and war have become a national obsession.
Social programs are being shoved into the
background. It is unreal of civil rights
leaders to try to ignore Vietnam.40
The FBI records indicate that King came to the conclusion that
the leaders were "marking time" with the war on poverty while
the war in Vietnam was going on. He felt that he needed to
get more involved in the peace movement, regardless of the
possible fact that his moving into the area of peace could
. . . . 41
render him ineffective in both movements. The records
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also show that he perhaps knew that his stand was "unrealisti¬
cally wrong tactically." But, he felt so strongly that the
U.S. government was wrong in its role in Vietnam that he no
longer could be cautious about taking a major stand against
the war. He affirmed, "I feel so deep in my heart that we
are so wrong in this country and the time has come for a
42
real prophecy, and I'm willing to go that road."
On February 25, 1967, at a Nation Institute Conference
in Los Angeles, California, King spoke from the title, "The
Casualties of the War in Vietnam." In this address, he
raised objections to the war from the level of physical
casualties to that of principles and values. Firstly, he
pointed out that the United States violated the United
Nations Charter by taking armed action against the Vietcong
43
and North Vietnam. After the French were defeated in 1954,
an agreement was made between the French and the Vietnamese -
the Geneva Agreements. There were many features.but rtost.
importantly, according to George Kahin and John Lewis, was
that the Agreements stipulated a date for general elections
for Vietnam to become a unified nation and banned the
introduction of "any troop reinforcement and additional
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personnel" in Vietnam from outside powers. In 1965 the
United States had a force of 23/000 men in Vietnam and by
44
the end of 1966/ 375/000. King stated/
We unilaterally launched an all-out war on
Asian soil. In the process we have under¬
mined the purpose of the United Nations
and caused its effectiveness to atrophy
...Even the long standing allies of our
nation have adamantly refused to join our
government in this ugly war.'^^
Secondly/ King stated that the United States was not
allowing Vietnam its right of self-determination and that it
was supporting a new form of colonialism. After Ho Chi Minh
declared the independence of Vietnam in 1945/ the French
tried to recolonize their former colony with the support of
America but they/ the French/ were defeated. When the
negotiated settlement was made in 1954 [Geneva Agreements]/
the United States sought to sabotage it. Unsuccessful in
doing thiS/ the United States refused to sign it.
Thirdly/ King stated clearly his. belief that the United
States was not investing enough funds in the Great Society.
According to Doris Kearns/ the Great Society Plan was for
almost everyone/ but it would have benefitted the poor the
most. It provided educational assistance/ higher minimum
wage for labor/ vocational training for the unskilled/ food
for the hungry/ housing/ poverty grants/ and legal protection.
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King/ "The Casualties of the War in Vietnam II
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However, for Johnson, losing a war was terrible but to lose
46
a war to Communists was out of the question. He once
declared, "I am not going to be the President who saw
47
Southeast Asia go the way China went." Johnson's diversion
from domestic affairs to foreign affairs, therefore, stifled
the Great Society. King said it was estimated that $322,000
(this figure later was increased to $500,000) was spent to
kill each enemy soldier while U.S. citizens classified as
"poor" were receiving only $53.00.
We have escalated the war in Vietnam and
de-escalated the skirmish against poverty.
The recently revealed mis-estimate of the
war budgets amount to ten billions of
dollars for a single year. This error
alone is more than five times the amount
committed to anti-poverty programs.“^8
Another casualty was the humility of our nation. "We
are arrogant in professing to be concerned about the freedom
of foreign nations while not setting our own home in order."
King noted Congressmen were willing to appropriate millions
of dollars to the war but voted down a Fair Housing bill
which made it impossible for a veteran of the Vietnam War
to purchase a decent, home. King pointed out the inconsistency
of a nation that sent blacks to kill on foreign lands and
offered little protection for their families in the South.
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"We are willing to make the Negro 100% of a citizen in
warfare, but reduce him to 50% of a citizen on American soil
A fifth casualty was that of dissent. King maintained
that there was a curtailment of free speech. He pointed out
that;
An ugly repressive sentiment to silence
peace-makers depicts advocates of immediate
negotiations and persons who call for a
cessation of bombings in the north as quasi¬
traitors, fools and venal enemies of our
soldiers and institutions.
Those who opposed the war were so vilified that King
questioned whether or not free speech was the major casualty
of the war. He mentioned that America has a tradition of
curtailing people's action of criticizing the government
when the nation is at war.
The final casualty was the prospect of mankind's
survival. "This war," said King, "has created climate for
greater armament and further expansion of destructive
nuclear power." He explained that there was a time when war
served the purpose of a negative good to stop an evil force;
but in the midst of outer space and guided ballistic missies
and nuclear destructiveness, no nation could claim a victory
Therefore, he proclaimed that man must find an alternative
to war, for the Vietnam War could ultimately lead to a world
war leaving "only smouldering ashes as a mute testimony of a
human race whose folly led inexorably to ultimate death."
King also said that the ferver of the civil rights movement
30
should be combined with that of the peace movement.
The next month, on March 25, 1967, in Chicago, King
led his first peace demonstration. He told a crowd of
5,000 demonstrators that:
We (U.S.) are committing atrocities equal
to any perpetrated by the Vietcong. We are
left standing before the world glutted by
our own barbarity. We engaged in a war that
seeks to turn the clock of history back and
perpetuate white colonialism...We often
arrogantly feel that we have some divine
messianic mission to police the whole world;
we are arrogant in not allowing young nations
to go through the same growing pains,
turbulence and revolution that characterized
our history. Our arrogance can be our doom.^O
This anti-Vietnam War rally was sponsored by the National
Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy of which Dr. Benjamin
Spock (the renown pediatrician), was co-chairman. Petitions
were signed urging President Johnson to end the bombing, to
negotiate a peace settlement, and to withdraw U.S. troops.
The rally was peaceful but a skirmish insued when members of
the American Nazi Party shouted, "Treason," seized anti-war
posters and threw them in the Chicago River. The police,
51
however, restored order.
A few days later, on March 30, King went to Louisville,
Kentucky, to attend a two-day conference of the Board of
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condemning the war as "morally and politically unjust.” In
Louisville/ King did not advocate civil disobedience as a
method of protest at that time. Nevertheless/ he stated/
"If our nation insists on escalating war/ it may be necessary
to engage in civil disobedience to further arouse the con¬
science of the nation and make it clear we feel this is
52
hurting our country." He also gave three reasons why he
became increasingly concerned and outspoken against the war:
(1) the war was playing havoc with domestic destinies; (2) a
continuation and constant escalation of the war could have
led to a conflict with China; and (3) a violent approach in
international affairs was inconsistent with the policy of
53 ....
nonviolence. After leaving Louisville, King went to New
York to give his "Beyond Vietnam" speech which was sponsored
by the Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam.
The Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam, now
Clergy and Laity Concerned, was formed in 1965 to work within
the Catholic, Jewish, and Protestant communities in opposition
to the role of the U.S. government in its military involvement
in Vietnam. King was co-Chairman of the-group which had its
motto, "A Time Comes When Silence is Betrayal." "The truth
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of these words is beyond doubt,” said King. The address
was given at the Riverside Baptist Church, April 4, 1967.
In an interview in Atlanta, April 1, 1985, Tom Offenburger,
who joined SCLC's staff in 1966 as Assistant Public
Information Director and is currently Chief of Communication
in the Mayor's Office, stated that Riverside was an important
national forum, particularly with the "church establishment."
It was a pulpit for speaking to moral and political issues
55
from a theoretical point of view.
On the evening of his "Beyond Vietnam" speech, "Every
Major Negro in this Country," declared Hosea Williams,
former Director of SCOPE, interviewed in Atlanta, March 13
1985, "came to Atlanta to persuade Martin not to come out
56 . .
against the war." Roy Wilkins, Jackie Robinson, A.
Phillip Randolph, and Whitney Young came to talk to King,
and that "they were sent here by the president of the
United States, Lyndon Baines Johnson." Their argument was,
continued Williams, "King, you are fixing to hurt the black
people. You are going international and that's not dealing
with civil rights. You are going to alienate a lot of
supporters of the Movement when you speak out against the
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war." King/ however/ rejected their plea.
The purpose of King's "Beyond Vietnam" address was to
answer the critical questions which he had been asked: "Why
are you speaking about the war/...Why are you joining the
voices of dissent/...Aren't you hurting the cause of your
people?" and to give a declarative statement'of his.position
57
towards the war. King's first reason was that the war had
a devestating effect on the poor? the promise of hope for the
poor was not being fulfilled. Because of the escalation in
Vietnam/ the Poverty Program
eviscerated as if it were some idle political
plaything of a society gone mad on war/ and
I knew that America would never invest the
necessary funds or energies in rehabilitation
of its poor so long as Vietnam continued to
draw men and skills and money like some demonic/
destructive suction tube. So I was increasingly
compelled to see the war as an enemy of the poor
and to attack it as such.^^
Later on November 27/ 1967/ a Newsweek report indicated that
the government spent $75 billion for defense and $1.6 billion
59
on the war on poverty.
Secondly/ the American government was sending black
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soldiers to Vietnam where they fought and died in "extra¬
ordinarily high proportion relative to the rest of the
population." It was sending black soldiers 8/000 miles away
to guarantee freedom and democracy in Southeast Asia/ which
they had not found in America. America watched black and
white boys on televison as they fought/ killed and died
together on the battlefield but could not seat them in the
same schoolroom.
According to King's Where Do We Go from Heret Chaos or
Community?, twice as many blacks as whites were in combat at
the beginning of 1967/ and twice as many blacks were killed
(20.6) in proportion to their numbers in the general popula-
tion. Michael Maclear also looked at the discrepancies in
numbers concerning blacks in this war by indicating that
black Americans comprised only 13 percent of the military in
0 2
Vietnam but 28 percent had combat assignments. Jack Foner
went further to support the contention that black troops
were utilized out of proportion to the ratio, of blacks to
whites. As the war escalated/ blacks constituted almost
16 percent of all draftees. The percentages would have been
Center for Nonviolent Social Change.
^King/ Jr./ "Beyond Vietnam."
C I
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higher had more blacks met the armed forces minimal education
standards. Foner maintains that after 1965, "the educational
standards were lowered to induct previously rejected blacks,
...simply to enlarge the military pool." In 1964, 18.8
percent of eligible whites were drafted compared to 30.2
percent of eligible blacks. In 1967, only 31 percent of
eligible whites were inducted compared to 67 percent of
eligible blacks. King felt that he "could not be silent in
64
the face of such cruel manipulation."
Thirdly, he insisted to blacks of the northern ghetto
that violence would not resolve their problems, and they,
in return, asked "What about Vietnam?" Isn't our government
using "massive doses of violence to solve its problems"?
King replied, "their guestion hit home, and I knew that I
could never again raise my voice against the violence of
the oppressed in the ghettos without having first spoken
clearly to the greatest purveyor of violence in the world
today — my own government."
King's next reason was expressed in the motto of SCLC
that he was trying "To Save the Soul of America." He stated:
If America's soul becomes totally poisoned,
part of the autopsy must read Vietnam. It
can never be saved so long as it destroys
the deepest hopes of men the world over.
So it is that those of us who are yet
determined that America will be are led
down the. path Of.protest and dissent, working
for the healthof our land.
6 3
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King's fifth reason came from a burden of responsibility
that was placed upon him- as winner of the Nobel Peace Prize.
He could not forget that the prize was a commission "to
work harder...for the 'brotherhood of man'" which took him
far beyond the barriers of "national allegiances,"^^ meaning
that he could not focus or limit his concern to a particular
group, the true practice of universal altruism.He had to
endeavor to broaden his scope to all areas of oppression,
whether it was in the United States, Vietnam, or elsewhere.
According to Williams, King's acceptance of the Peace Prize was
received by him as an advocator for peace around the world
for all mankind. And, if he did not oppose the war, he would
G7
have betrayed the intent of the award.
King also had a commitment to the Gospel of Jesus Christ.
He sometimes, marvelled at .those who questioned why he was
opposed to the war. But he answered them by asking.
Could it be that they do not know that the
good news was meant for all men — for
communist and capitalist, for their children
and ours, for black and white, for revolutionary
and conservative? Have they forgotten that my
ministry is in obedience to the One who loved
his enemies so fully that he died for them?
What can I say to the Vietcong or to Castro
or to Mao as a faithful minister of this One?
Can I threaten them with death, or must I
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In the view of the Vietnamese people, said King, Americans
must be seen as strange liberators. He explained that when
the Vietnamese proclaimed their independence from a combined
French and Japanese domination in 1945, they quoted our
Declaration of Independence — that all men are created equal
— in their docximent of freedom but the United States refused
to recognize them.
King reminded his listeners of the former relationship
between the U.S. and Vietnam. After the Vietnamese proclaimed
their independence, the United States supported the French in
trying to recolonize Vietnam. It came to the point that the
United States met over 80 percent of the French war costs.
Even when the French were defeated and started withdrawing,
America continued to encourage them with "hugh financial
and military supplies to continue the war." When the French
were finally defeated, the United States was determined that
Vietnam would not be unified. The government began support¬
ing Diem who "ruthlessly routed out all opposition...and
refused even to discuss reunification with the North." King
further explained that
the peasants watched...as we poison their
water, as we kill a million acres of their
crops...They wander into the hospitals,
with at least 20 casualties from American
firepower for each Vietcong-inflicted
injury. So far we may have killed a million
of them — mostly children.-
King spoke of other reasons why America was seen as
strange liberators. The United States insisted on giving
38
the National Liberation Front the blanket name of "Communist/"
although its membership contained less that 25 percent; the
Saigon press ,'was allowed to be censored by the Military
Junta; the United States breached the Geneva'Agreements
concerning foreign troops; and, Hanoi made overtures for
peace, but the President claimed that "none existed."
In his opposition. King said that he spoke as a child
of God and as a brother to the suffering poor of 'Vietnam
and America. He spoke as a citizen of the world and as an
American. He told the audience, "In order to atone for our
sins and errors in Vietnam, we should take the initiative
in bringing the war to a halt." And, therefore, he presented
five suggesstions that could have possibly abrogated the
crisis. They are as follows:
1. End all bombing in North and South Vietnam;
2. Declare a unilateral cease-fire in the hope
that such action will create the atmosphere
for negotiation;
3. Take immediate steps to prevent other battle¬
grounds in Southeast Asia by curtailing our
military build-up in Thailand and inter¬
ference in Laos;
4. Realistically accept the fact that the
National Liberation Front has substantial
support in South Vietnam and must thereby
play a role in any meaningful negotiations
and in any future Vietnam government;
5. Set a date on which we will remove all
foreign troops from Vietnam in accordance
with the 1954 Geneva Agreement.
After the mentioning of his proposals. King gave his
final reason for opposing the war. He saw America's




counter-revolutionary force in the world community. Thus,
he stated,, "that our nation [is] on the wrong side of a
world revolution." He supported this contention by pointing
out that military advisors were sent to Venezuela; forces
were sent to Guatemala to maintain social stability for our
investments there; American helicopters were being used
against guerrillas in Colombia; and, American napalm and
Green Beret forces were active in Peru. He reminded the
audience of the words of John F. Kennedy, "Those who make
peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution
inevitable." King affirmed that "If we are to get the right
side of the world revolution, we as a nation must undergo a
radical revolution of values." Then, racism, materialism,
and militarism would be capable of being conquered.
According to King, a true revolution of values would
question the fairness of past and present policies of the
United States. It would look upon the contrast of poverty
and wealth. It would look at the individual capitalists of
the West that were investing in Africa, Asia, and South
America only for the sake of profit and say; "this is not
just." He continued;
A true revolution of values will lay hands on
the world order and say of war; this of
settling differences is not just. This
business of burning human beings with
napalm, of filling our nation's homes with
orphans and widows, of injecting poisonous
drugs of hate into the veins of people
normally humane, of sending men home from
dark and bloody battlefields physically
handicapped and psychologically deranged.
40
cannot be reconciled with wisdom, justice,
and love.
King maintained that the way of settling differences
by war is not the answer. Communism will never be defeated
by bombs, atomic or nuclear. The best defense against
communist is a positive revolution of values. There is
of need for a worldwide fellowship that would go beyond one's
tribe, race, class and nation. "Our loyalties must become
ecumenial rathern than sectional."
After professing that new ways must be found for peace
in Vietnam and justice throughout the developing world.
King concluded his speech by stating, "The choice is ours,
and though we might prefer it otherwise we. much choose'in
. . . 70
this crucial moment of human history." Reverend Emory
Searcy, Jr., Clergy and Laity Concern, Regional Representative,
interviewed in Atlanta on March 12, 1985, summed up the speech
by saying that King was trying to paint an international
picture — an international view that America could really
be great beyond its imagination if it chooses to have a
wholistic perspective of what is good for the world rather
71
than a single view of what is good for it.
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Interview with Reverend Emory Searcy, Regional
Representative (Georgia, Alabama, and Lousiana) for Clergy
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On April 15, 1967, in New York, King along with thousands
of Americans, staged the most massive peace demonstration in
72
American history. The police estimated that between
100,000 and 125,000 people took part in the rally, but King
and others felt that it was a low estimate and maintained
that the crowd was between 400,000 and 500,000
73 ...
people. People from all walks of life participated:
Sioux Indians, academicians in their caps and gowns, doctors
in their medical jackets, hippies, militant leftists.
Communists, black nationalists, veterans of World War I
and li and Korea, Puerto Ricans, Canadians, union members,
actors, poets, musicians, puppeteers, and pacifists, liberals,
74
anarchists, and socialists. They all marched from Central
Park with King, Spock, Harry Belafonte, actor,. McKissick, and
Stokely Carmichael, Chairman of the Student Nonviolent
Coordinating Committee (SNCC), and other civil rights leaders
to the United Nations building where King presented Dr.
Ralph Bunche, a Nobel Prize winner (1950) and an ambassador
to the United Nations, with a note stating.
We rally at the United Nations in order
to affirm support of the principals of
peace, universality, equal rights and
and Laity Concerned, Atlanta, Georgia, 12 March 1985.
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self-determination of peoples embodied in
the Charter and acclaimed by mankind, but
violated by the United States.
At the rally. King's major.theme was "Stop the Bombing."
He spoke of the irony and inconsistency of the government
protecting people from totalitarian rule while..at the same
time supporting a dictatorship in South Vietnam and reiterated
76his conviction to continue his civil rights activities.
In May 1967, at the SCLC convention in South Carolina,
King spoke extensively about Vietnam, and although he made
references to Vietnam in several speeches and interviews
after that, his last major speech on Vietnam in 1967 was
given on Memorial Day at the National Labor Leadership
Conference at the University of Chicago. His topic was
"The Domestic Impact of the War in Vietnam." Other than
making the Great Society a myth, the war, said King,
strengthened domestic reaction: it gave it those anti-forces
(anti-labor, anti-black, anti-hximanist, and extremists) "a
weapon of spurious patriotism to galvanize its supporters
. . . . 77
into reaching for powers right up to the White House."
Of course, interestingly enough. King was referring to
Ronald Reagan when he said, "when a Hollywood performer,
^^"100,000 Rally at U.N. Against Vietnam War," New York
Times, 16 April 1967, sec. 1, p. 3.
76
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lacking distinction even as an actor, can become a leading
war hawk candidate for the presidency only the irrationalities
induced by a war psychosis can explain such a melancholy
turn of events."
King felt that the war was doing damage to the decaying
cities and that it was slowing the rate of racial progress.
He also questioned how the Administration could denounce
violence of blacks in the ghetto while it uses violence in
Asia that shocked the world. Another impact of the war was,
as King had mentioned before, its economic effect on the
anti-poverty programs. Employment was increased to 15
percent, and thousands were dismissed from their jobs and
training programs because of the inflation brought about
by the war. "Inflation," said King, "has stopped creeping
and has begun running."
King maintained that the government had the resources to
carry on the war and at the same time fulfill its promise
of domestic reform. But, he was well aware that the
United States would not do both because Congress was devoted
to the pursuit of war, and it would, not endanger its defense
budget for the sake of the social good.
This is the unescapable contradiction
between war and social progress at home.
Military adventure must stultify domestic
progress to insure the certainty of
military success. This is the reason the
poor and particularly Negroes have a





The war also had a destructive effect on the young
generation. Other than being killed in Vietnam, King opined
that they were experiencing a crisis worst than that of the
depression; they were the first generation in American
history to go through four wars in twenty-five years -
World War II, the Cold War, the Korean War and the war in
Vietnam.
Finally,, King postulated that the United States was in
a triple-ring of isolation and alienation: the government
was isolated from the majority of people who wanted either
withdrawal, de-escalation or honest negotiations; the
United States was without a single significant international
ally; and the pro-war forces in South Vietnam received less
79
than one-third the votes in their election.
King opposed the war until his death. Two months before
his assassination, in a sermon at Ebenezer, he emphatically
declared, "God didn't call America to engage in a senseless,
unjust war (such) as in Vietnam. And we are criminals in that
war! We have committed more war crimes almost than any other
8 0nation in the world, and I'm going to continue to say it."
Two days later, at a second Mobilization of Clergy and Laymen
Concerned about Vietnam, which took place in Washington, D.C.,
February 6, 1968 speaking form the subject "Vietnam is Upon
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M.L. King, Jr., "Drum Major Instinct," 4 February 1968,
MLK Papers, Box 14, U.C.
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reaffirmed his stand that peace and civil rights were tied
together (ironically, Washington, D.C. was the first place
King made known his opinion that the United States should
negotiate a peace settlement in Vietnam and the last place
81
he delivered a speech devoted entirely to the war).
On March 3, 1968, King delivered his last sermon at
Ebenezer entitled, "Unfulfilled" Dreams." Almost emphatically
he spoke of great men who, while in the evening of adulthood,
wanted to accomplish one more goal in their lives. Ironically,
they died before their goals were reached, but they tried to
attain it. Perhaps King was telling the country that he had
8 2
not made real all of his dreams, but that he had tried.
A month and a day later, he was dead.
On the day King was killed, a scrap of paper was found
in his pocket listing the "Ten Commandments of Vietnam"
which he had intended to give in a speech at an ahti-Vietnam
rally to be held in New York on April 27, 1968. His wife,
Coretta Scott King, spoke in his place. The commandments
are as follows:
Thou Shalt not believe in a military victory.
Thou Shalt not believe in a political victory.
Thou Shalt not believe that they - the
Vietnamese - love us.
Thou Shalt not believe that the Saigon
government has support of the people.
81
M.L. King, Jr., "Vietnam is Upon Us,". 6 February 1968,
MLK Papers, Box 14, U.C.
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M.L. King, Jr., "Unfulfilled Dreams," 3 March 1968,
MLK Papers, Box 14, U.C. This was his last address at Ebenezer,
his home church. He made other addresses elsewhere.
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Thou Shalt not believe that the majority of
the South Vietnamese look upon the Viet Cong
as territories.
Thou Shalt not believe the figure of killed
enemies or killed Americans.
Thou shalt not believe that the generals
know best.
Thou shalt not believe that the enemy's
victory means communism.
Thou shalt not believe that the world supports
the United States.
Thou shalt not kill.®^
Although King did not live long enough to see the termi¬
nation of the Vietnam War, he was optimistic about its
coming to an end. This optimism was forcefully expressed
at the conclusion of King's Chicago speech, November 11, 1967,
when he quoted the words of Eugene" Debs who was being sentenced
for his opposition to World War I:
I can see the dawn of a better day for humanity.
The people awakening in due course of time,
will come to their own. When the mariner sailing
over tropic seas, looks for release from his.
weary watch, he turns his eye towards the Southern
Cross bearing luridly above the tempest tossed
ocean. As the midnight approaches, the Southern
Cross begins to bend, then the whirling worlds
choose their places, and with starry fingerpoint,
the almighty (sic) marks the page of time upon the
dial of the universe and though no bell may beat
the glad tiding, the lookout knows the midnight is
passing - that relief and rest are close at hand.
Let the people take heart and hope everywhere for
the cross is bending, the midnight is passing and
joy cometh with the morning.
8 3Lionel Lokos, The Life and Legacy of Martin Luther
King, Jr. (New Rochelle, N;Y.: Arlington'House,'1968),
pp. 402-403.
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On April 30, 1975, 7:53 a.in. seven years after his
death, one of King's dreams came to pass: the Vietnam ¥ar
was over. It was to be several years later before much of
the criticism uttered by King was to be accepted as having
validity. His criticisms were prophetic and most people
of his day did not understand him and, therefore, questioned
and even condemned him for speaking out against the war,
although he had the constitutional right to do so. The
following chapter records some of the criticisms he received.
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Maclear, The Ten Thousand Day War, p. 347.
CHAPTER III
THE CRITICAL RESPONSES
The ultimate measure of a man is not. where
he stands in moments of convenience and
moments of comfort, but where he stands in
moments of challenge and moments of controversy.
- Speech to the United Nations about
Vietnam, April 15, 1967
There were two primary criticisms of King's anti-war
stand in 1965. First, that he was a minister and a civil
rights worker and should leave international disagreements
to experts. Second, the philosophy of nonviolence was
inapplicable and impratical within the dimensions of inter¬
nationalism. The Herald Examiner asserted that King did not
help the cause of an honorable peace in Vietnam one iota.
"The Nobel Peace Prize does not confer on any recipient the
status of a world statesman." Max Freedman, a syndicated
column writer for The Enquirer asked, "Is he casting a role
in Vietnam because the civil rights struggle is no longer
adequate to his own talents?" The coliomnist suggested that
King's criticism placed him "in the danger of becoming a' bore,
an intruder with no business and a busybody causing mischief."
The Philadelphia Inquirer, which King said was the "most
scatching," opined that he did not have license to speak
48
49
for the U.S. government and had "taken a strange flight of
fantasy into never-never land with his self-indulgent dream
of achieving instant expertise in foreign relations by virtue
of winning a Nobel Prize.
Members of Congress were not without remarks either.
Representative Francis P. Bolton of Ohio^ a member of the
House Foreign Affairs Committee/ said King "doesn't know
. . 2
what he is talking about." Senator Barry Goldwater of
Arizona declared.
It would be a serious mistake to permit his
image as a Negro leader and Nobel laureate
to distort or disminish the criticism he
deserves for his far-fetched meddling in the
Vietnamese [W]ar...Any...American...should
be priviledged to speak out against Dr. King
on this Vietnamese matter...Dr. King is inept
and wrong when it comes to Vietnam.^
Senator Thomas Dodd of Connecticut postulated that King "has
absolutely no competence to speak about complex matters of
4 . . .
foreign policy." Mendal Rivers of South Carolina displayed
his dislike for King's venture in foreign affairs by declaring,
"I don't make any comment on anything this individual says on
^"Newspaper Articles, August-September, 1965," MLK
Papers, Box 18.
^"Vietnam, June 1963 - August 1965," MLK Papers,
Box 25.
3
"Vietnam Involvement Not for Dr. King," Atlanta
Constitution, 8 September 1965 [no page number], Atlanta
University Archives.
4 . . .
"King Acts for Peace," Christian Century 82 (September
1965), p. 1180; "Dodd...Scores King for View- on China," New York
Times, 12 September 1965, sec. 1, p. 36.
50
on any subject." Others who voiced dissatisfaction were
Senator John Sparkman of Alabama, Representative H.R. Gross
5
of Iowa, and Senator Karl Mundt of South Dakota. As a
rebuttle. King admitted that he was not an expert in
international affairs but that he could lay claim to being
an "expert in recognition of a simply eloquent truth" that
war was wrong. In refutation to the impracticality of non¬
violence, he cited the example of India's usage of nonviolence
0
as a strategy to win its freedom. During this early period
of criticisms King did, however, receive words of encourage¬
ment .
Two Senators supported King in his right to speak.
Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon felt that King was "unanswerably
7
right" in his estimation of the war, and Senator J. William
Fulbright of Arkansas praised King by maintaining:
Your courageous and prophetic leadership in
the whole field of foreign affairs is a
tremendous encouragement to me personally.
In many respects the destiny of our nation
may rest largely in your hands...I trust
that you will not let any pressure silence
you, and that you will continue to speak in
a firm, reasoned, objective manner to our
nation and the world.^
^"Vietnam, June 1963 - August 1965," MLK Papers, Box 25.
0
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51
In 1967 after he had given his April Fourth speech. King,
again, was denounced. The criticism this time was his
merging the civil rights movement and the peace movement.
The New York Times postulated that King's connection of the
escalation in Vietnam and de-escalation of the war on
poverty was "too facile" and that linking the two movements
Q
would lead to deeper confusion. The Washington Post and
Time Herald supported this view by declaring.
Dr. King has done a grave injury to those
who are his natural allies in a great
struggle to remove ancient abuses from
our public life...He has diminished his
usefulness to his cause, to his country
and to his people.iO
The Burlington Free Press viciously attacked him by stating,
"King's remarks are seditious which reveal a high level of
ignorance and naivete.
Life magazine asserted that much of King's speech "was
a demogogic slander which sounded like a script for Radio
Hanoi," that he came close to betraying his cause by linking
the two movements with total opposition to the U.S. position
in Vietnam. Life believed that he should have provided more
leadership to the faltering civil rights movement instead of
9 . . .
"Dr, King's Error," New York Times, 7 April 1967, sec. 1,
p. 36.
10"A Tragedy," Washington Post and Time Herald, 6 April
1967, sec. A, p. 20.
^^"General Correspondence, 1967 (a),:" MLK: Papers, Box 99.
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wrestling of the cause of peace. It granted that Dr. King
could have been expected to. have strong personal reservation
12
about the war, but he went beyond personal right to dissent.
. . . . . 13
Facing these types of criticisms. King cried.
According to Herbert Aptheker, King was not advocating
a fusion, he was insisting on the interconnection of the two
14
where both movements would be strengthened. In other words.
King wanted the civil rights and peace movements to be allies.
He, himself, admitted that the two were not tied together
from an organization point of view but from a content point
15
of view.
Representative Jonathan B. Bingham of New York, speaking
in the House of Representatives, stated, "Dr. King's five-
point program...is...wholly unrealistic." His description
of the problems in Vietnam is "fearfully one-sided and
distorted...and I believe that Dr. King is cruel in telling
American Negro fighting men in Vietnam that they are victims
1 0
of discrimination." Senator Jacob Javits also of New York
12 . . .
"Dr. King 's Disservice to His Cause," Life 62 (April
1967), p. 4.
13 . . .
David Garrow, The FBI and Martin Luther King, Jr.;
From "Solo" to Memphis (New York: W.W. Norton and Company,
1918), p. 181.
14
Herbert Aptheker, Afro-American History: The Modern
Era (New York: The Citadel Press, 1971), p..268.
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CBS "Face the Nation," 16 April 1967, MLK Papers,
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53
stated, concerning King's criticisms, "It's certainly bound
to be resented by the country which is deeply involved in the
war and which feels it can certainly do justice by the Negro
at one and the same time."^^ According to the New York Times,
Javits disapproved "very strongly" of King's connection of
the struggle for civil rights and the war, particularly when
King's view was a minority view.
Dr. Billy Graham, the famous Southern evangelist said,
"Surely Negroes are divided about the v/ar as the rest of us
and his [King] action is an affront to the thousands of loyal
Negro troops who are in Vietnam." He further stated that the
anti-Vietnam war protesters "so exagerate our divisions over
the war that they could make Hanoi confident that it will
eventually win," and that they are "giving comfort to the
enemy."19
King slso received criticisms from the general population.
One writer from California wrote to SCLC,
I can't no longer contribute, in conscience,
funds for social amelioration to Martin
Luther King, and I must write you of my
despair [of] that fact. The love and
respect I hold for the great Martin
Luther King makes me beg you to ponder
well your present role. Do you, like many
113, 8497.
17
"NAACP to Avoid Stand on Vietnam," New York Times.
11 April 1967, sec. 1, p. 17; "Goldwater Backs Johnson on
War," New York Times, 10 April 1967, sec. 1, p. 2.
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19 "Graham Denounces Dissenters," Christian Centurv 84
(May 1967), p. 645.
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20
of us, miss the man from Montgomery.
A professor Emeritus and a retired professor wrote, "We are
...sorry that you have taken a public stand on an issue
different from that to help the Negro...Our support of all
21
efforts initiated by you has thus been lost." Albert C.
Anderson, Jr. of the Mutual Benefit' Life of Newark, New
Jersey, wrote.
Up to now I've been on your side. Your
statement...regarding our involvement
in the Viet Nam War is irresponsible,
uninformed, and careless...! just can't
imagine you going off so 'half-cocked.'
I am terribly disappointed in you.^^
King received friendly correspondence from well-wishers
as well. A New York residence wrote, "Your courage in
speaking out was most heartening. I admire your courage and
understanding. Since the going will get rougher from now on
23
- enclosed is a contribution." One writer from Vermont
wrote, "I am pleased to see Dr. King speaking out against
the war in Vietnam. Because of this I have raised my
24
contribution from $5.00 to $25.00." Another writer from
California declared, "The fact that you jeopardized your
20
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1967, MLK Papers, Box 99.
21
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total commitment to the Civil Rights Movement in this country
only indicates...what an enormous crisis the war in Vietnam
has become.Still another wrote, "It's difficult for me
to see why all Negro organizations won't support you in your
..26
drive.to bring about peace instead of condemning you."
Finally, a man lacking in the fundamental skills of writing
expressed his support clearly,
1 sure like the way you come out agin
the war in'Vetnam...They [those who
supported the war] dont like talk agin
the war you lible to have a acident
sometime and then you be quiet...So if
you brave man and dont car what happen
to you I sure like you to hear you talk
and wish you a lot of good luck.^'7
King not only was reprobated by the press, public
officials, and people who send correspondence, he was
criticized by his own people, including ministers within SCLC
who privately criticized him and by other civil rights
2 8
leaders who disagreed with his anti-war stand. After
King's speech in Petersburg in 1965, delegates to a CORE
25 ...
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convention had approved of a resolution to remove U.S. troops
from Vietnam and the Dominican Republic. But because of the
persuasive power of Farmer/ the resolution was withdrawn. He
felt that the stand would not do well with public opinion and
to involve the Movement in foreign policy could fragment the
. 29 ...
black community. On "Face the Nation", Wilkins was
questioned whether the NAACP would attempt to influence the
U.S. foreign policy through moral forces. Wilkins stated,
"We think we have enough Vietnam in Alabama to occupy our
our attention. We will leave foreign policy to the U.S.
...We don't believe in dividing our energies; we don't have
..30
many energies."
George Weaver, Assistant Secretary of Labor under the
Johnson administration, addressing a convention of black
Masonic leaders in Newark, New Jersey, on August 19, 1965,
criticised civil rights leaders who were engaged in the
opposition to the Vietnam War. Although Weaver did not get
into name calling, it was reported that he was making
reference to King's statement of a negotiated settlement.
He stated that certain statements by prominent U.S. leaders
might give an erroneous impression that a large number of
. • . 31
Americans did not support Johnson'.s Vietnam_ policy.
29 . ...
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According to Weaver, interviewed in Atlanta^ March 3, 1985,
the lack of information about Vietnam at that time- had a
great bearing on his thinking. At first, he said had he
known then what he knows of the Vietnam fiasco, he would
have taken a different position, but changed his mind by
expressing, "It is easy to say that I would have taken a
different position but to be honest and candid, I don't
know what position I would have taken." Nontheless, viewing
the -war in its historical perspective, "I quickly admit...
that Dr. King was right." "It increases one's admiration
for a leader like Dr. King who had the foresight and the
imagination to take the position that he took at that time."
Weaver also said that King caused a lot of pain to the
. . . . . . 32
administration, particularly since he was so admired.
In April of 1967, to counteract King's position on the
war, the NAACP's Board of Directors voted unanimously to
oppose his "merger." The Board characterized King's action
as "a serious tactical mistake," because the action "will
. . . 33
serve the cause neither of civil rights nor of peace."
King, according to the FBI files, made a conference
call to some of his staff members and wanted to discuss the
criticisms he received from the NAACP, the New York Times,
the Washington Post, and Senator Javits of New York about
32
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his fusing the two movements. He felt that their attack
was without grounds and untrue. He simply said, "they are
lying." Now was the time "to stop the lie and let them
attack me on the basic points they want to attack me on
34
and stop going around making up something." What this
statement means, one can only surmise but, more than a
month later. King stated:
Now I know the voices that are being raised
and they are enjoying it now. Because they
can lash out against Martin Luther King.
They have been wanting to do it all along,
and they have found a good excuse - they
feel. Saying the two issues can't be mixed.
That it's hurting the civil rights movement,
to take a stand against the war in Vietnam
...The war in Vietnam is doing much more to
hurt civil rights than our standing against
the war is doing...That white America, by
and large has constantly vacillated and has
been ambivalent about equal rights for
Negroes...What is hurting civil rights is
that most white people in this country are
not committed to it. And they are always
looking for some excuse.
During the conference call. King must have been very
angry or deeply hurt, for he wanted to denounce his attackers
with "vigorous language," particularly the NAACP, in spite of
the fact that he was warned beforehand by Abernathy that
denounciation should be done with dignity and in a states¬
manlike manner. It was agreed that a statement to offset
34
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3 6
the myth be made to the press.
On the following morning at the press conference. King
attempted to clear up the issue of merging the movements.
He said, "I hold no such view” and went on to explain:
I am-, saddened that the Board of Directors of
the NAACP...would join in the perpetuation of
the myths about my views. They have challenged
and repudiated a non-existent proposition...!
challenge the NAACP and other critics of my
position to take a forthright stand on the
rightness or wrongness of the war...We [SCLC]
do not believe in any merger of fusion or
movements but we egually believe that no one
can pretend that the existence of the war is
not profoundly affecting the destiny of civil
rights progress.
Meanwhile, Ralph Bunche, evidently with no knowledge of
the latest statement by King, expressed the opinion that
"In my view. Dr. King should positively and publicly give
up one role or the other. The two efforts have little in
3 8
common." Fearing that Bunche's statement would have an
adverse effect on other civil rights leaders. King decided
to call Bunche in order to give him a better understanding
of the situation. According to King, Bunch replied that
. . 39
"he misunderstood my position."
^^Conference Call, FBI 100-111180-9-1271.
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Later, in a press statement, Bunche said' he was happy
to know that King was not attempting to merge the two
movements and, in substance, retracted his criticism. King
was still disappointed because Bunche lacked "moral courage"
to speak out publicly against the war, particularly since he
admitted, "Martin, I want you to know I agree with every¬
thing you are saying about Vietnam. I am absolutely opposed
4. • ..40to our policy."
Another prominent black who was not in favor of King's
stand was Whitney Young. He stated, "Urgent domestic
programs of civil rights and the issue of the Vietnam War
should remain separate." Jackie Robinson, former baseball
star and Special Assistant on Community Affairs to New York's
Governor Rockefeller stated, "Dr. King has always been my
favorite civil rights leader, but I don't agree with him on
. . 41
this issue." Senator Edward Brooke of Massachusetts said
of King,
My objectives to what Dr. King has done, and
as I've said, I don't question his motives, I
question his judgment, in that in tying of
Vietnam War into the civil rights movment, that
he is doing irreparable harm to the civil rights
movement.42
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to the researcher, the former U.S. Senator wrote that he
never questioned. King's judgment. "It was only my. thought
that he was only human and that his energies could best be
. . . 4
used in the monumental struggle for human and civil rights."
According to Brooke, while he and King were in Europe, King
had convinced him that he felt it a duty, as a minister, to
oppose the war "which he [King] found legally and morally
wrong." He also added that if one checks his voting record
in:the U.S. Senate, it will be found that he "never supported
the Vietnam conflict and consistently supported amendments to
, . . 44
bring it to a conclusion."
Carl T. Rowan, a syndicated column writer for more than
a hundred newspapers asked, "Why did King reject, the
. . . 45
advice of his old civil rights colleagues?" He gave two
probable reasons: some said it was a matter of ego, others
that the talk of communistic actions and words influenced
him. The latter reason disturbed civil rights leaders more
than anything else. Regardless of the reasons. Rowan claimed
King has alienated many of the Negro's
friends and armed the Negro's foes, in
both parties, by creating the impression









Rowan, "Martin Luther King's Tragic Decision




that the Negro is disloyal. By urging
Negroes not to respond to the draft or
to fight in Vietnam, he has taken a tack
that many Americans of all races consider
irresponsible.^^
Rowan also said in a report that one of every two blacks
thought King was wrong while 27% reserved judgment.
Of all the criticisms King received, perhaps the most
significant came from King himself. He must have been at
a low point a few days after his "Beyond Vietnam" speech,
particularly after reading the comments and editorials that
attempted to defame him. And, he must have done some
serious soul searching to expouse self-criticism. "I was
probably politically unwise...[and]...I may not have been
47
cautious enough." In spite of the fact. King perhaps
found a source of relief in SCLC's opposition to the war.
Although there was some controversy of SCLC's Board
of Directors in supporting King, he somehow gathered more
support because the Board (1966) passed a resolution calling
on the U.S. government to- desist from aiding the military
junta against the Buddhists, Catholics and students of
Vietnam whose efforts to democratize their government are
more in consonance with our traditions than the policy of
the military oligarchy; make a forthright declaration that
until a solution is reached, no program for human betterment
46
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at home will be sacrificed or curtailed; and, to reassess
our position and seriously examine the wisdom of prompt
withdrawal. Moreover, at the convention, SCLC passed a
resolution that the Administration should immediatly take
steps to de-escalate unilaterally and if there is a positive
response, to continue systematically to diminish hostility;
expressly and officially repudiate the impudent and immoral
threat of General Ky to enlarge the war; guarantee that no
domestic program for the benefit of the poor, black and
white, will be curtailed on the pretense that our opulent
society can afford only the waging of war; review draft,
re-enlistment.and combat assignments so that genuinely
democratic sharing of responsibilities will replace the
. . . 49
present practices of class and race discrimination.
Evidence of more support by SCLC was also made visible
in early 1967 when Andrew Young, its Executive Director,
defended King against criticisms of his stand on the war
in a pamphlet entitled, "Those Questions Have Been Asked
...Does Martin Luther King, Jr. Have the Right? The
... 50 .
Qualifications? The Duty to Speak Out on Peace." In this
pamphlet. Young wrote,
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In recent weeks some of the press has
headlined several attacks on Dr. King's
expressions on peace. Most people do not
have an opportunity to read rebuttals
which are always less prominently presented.
They are particularly important because more
than a few of the attacks were based on mis¬
conceptions of Dr. King's positions. An
example is Dr. Bunche's criticism which was
trumpted on T.V. and Radio and beneath
monster newspaper headlines. When Dr. Bunche
withdrew his criticism with characteristic
forthrightness and speed, his remarks were
almost laniversally ignored by the press.
The following examples are listed in the pamphlet. James P.
Brown, an editorial writer for the Providence Journal wrote,
"Dr.,King's critics don't understand the situation. They
don't understand Dr. King. They don't understand the civil
right movement. They don't understand the war in-Vietnam.
Above all, they fail to perceive the moral thread that ties
this man and these causes inescapably together." Max Lerner
of the New York Post said that King's position on the war
was not different than that of Senator Fulbright and pointed
out the inconsistency that, "If King were white, not black,
no one could deny his right to make this connection. Why
then fault him as a black? Why ask him to decide which move¬
ment - peace or civil rights - he wants to fight for?
Clearly, he wants to fight for both." Commenting on the
New York Times editorial, "Dr. King's Error," John P.C.
Matthews of Princeton, New Jersey wrote, the Times has, in




and done an unfortunate disservice to a great American
and a great Christian.
Support of King's position came from sources other than
SCLC. The Christian Century responded to King's April
Fourth speech by reporting, "King's plea was a magnificient
blend of eloquence and raw of searing denunciation and
tender wooing, of political sagacity and Christian insight,
. . . 52
of tough realism and infinite compassion."
The Nation proclaimed, "Dr. King's Riverside Church
Speech will rank as one of the most significant of his
,.53career."
In reference to King's colleagues-turned-critics, the
Christianity and Crisis magazine explained that King's speech
was misinterpreted? it suggested interdependence between the
two movements instead of a fusion.
King was not dealing at the level of
merging movements, nor was he concerning
himself with tactical questions. He was
speaking out of his conviction that non¬
violence within a nation at the same time
that nation savagely denies it abroad.
In addition to support which King received from individuals
and others, he got positive reinforcement from the 48 members
of the Social Justice Department of the National Council of
52 . . .
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Churches which unanimously approved of a resolution in
support of King's warning that the war was crippling the
anti-poverty programs. King "has once again focused our
attention on the relationship between a growing commitment
to military expansion and the daily deterioration Of economic
development at home and abroad. It also added that "we
must not allow attacks upon him to divert attention from
. . . 55
the necessity of facing these issues."
Although others sought to balance the attack on King/
he, himself, was not without rebuttle. On April 30, 1967,
at Ebenezer, King called attention to his critics. He
avouched:
It's been a lot of applauding over the last
few years. They have applauded our total
movement and they have applauded me. America
and most of its newspapers applauded me in
Montgomery...They applauded us in the sit-in
-movements...They have applauded on the
freedom rides...They praised us in Albany
and Birmingham, and Selma, Alabama. Oh, the
press was so noble in its applause and so
noble in its praise when I would say, 'Be
nonviolent toward Bull Connor;' when I would
say, ‘Be nonviolent toward Jim Clark.' There
is something strangely inconsistent about a
nation and a press that would praise you when
you say 'Be nonviolent toward Jim Clark,' but
will curse and damn you to say, 'Be nonviolent
toward little brown Vietnamese children!
Looking back over the situation, Floyd MicKissick said
that King had done exactly what was supposed to have been
55 . . .
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done. King was in a position to get criticized for any¬
thing he did, but he was the one to make statements to
advance blacks at that time. "King recognized what the war
in Vietnam was doing a long time ago...the criticisms he
. . 57
received was so unfair." According to Offenburger,
President Johnson and his administration played a hand in
the criticisms. The Administration had encouraged black
leaders to criticize King. "But it didn't work. The
criticisms made him more determined. It has the opposite
effects of reinforcing King's action all the more to oppose
58
the war." Searcy states that civil rights leaders had a
legitimate cause for opposing King, and they were right with
the insight they possessed at that time, but history has
proven them wrong.
King was right almost to the- minute degree
in analization of what was gg>ing on then
and what is going on now. The opponents of
his anti-Vietnam view could only see Vietnam,
but King had a view that went beyond and
that is why his speech is appropriately entitled,
'Beyond Vietnam.
In a telephone conversation recorded by the FBI between
Levison and an unknown person, it was said that King stated.
57 , . . .
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"I can see ahead where South America is going to become the
next Vietnam.And in May of 1967, at the SCLC retreat.
King maintained that', the Vietnam War was not. the only
problem that bothered him, "For I see it as merely being
symptomatic- of a deeper malady of the American spirit. And
if we don't deal with that, we are going to have a lot of
0
other Vietnams - ten or twelve - Vietnams in Latin America."
As the war continued although many supported the
Administration's role in Vietnam, many also began to reassess
their-attitude about America's longest war. Senator Javits
who once disapproved "very strongly" of King's anti-war
sentiment supported a compromise on the war. He admitted,
"We [U.S.] cannot continue to escalate the war in pursuit
of an illusory military victory;" and he also maintained
that the United States should work with the Soviet Union to
0 2
start peace negotiations.
In three editorials, two less than a week apart, the
New York Times, too re>-evaluated its position toward the war.
The first editorial February 14, 1968 read.
Unless the war is brought speedily to a
negotiated end, who can doubt that there
will be more such demands [reinforcement
of troops]...The best way to insure the
safety of American troops and the security
^^"UnMale to Stanley Levison," 5 April 1967, 100-111180-
9-1265a.
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"Javits Opens Bid for a Third Term," New York Times,
28 February 1968, sec. 1, p. 36.
69
of national interests is to concentrate on
the initiation of peace talks.
Three days later, it urged an immediate bombing pause by
stating, "There is no compelling reason why the strategic air
campaign against the North should not be stopped on even the
64
slimmest chance that such restraint could,lead to talks.”
Finally, it asserted, "the time has come...for 'escalating
65
our peace efforts'."
Life magazine also fell in line by proclaiming, "It is
00time to reassess our strategy in Vietnam."
Whitney Young of the National Urban League changed his
mind about the war and characterized it as a "'moral and
spiritual drain' that diverted the nation from 'the urban
and racial crisis'." His reason to oppose the war was
similar to King's position by acknowledging, "this war has
an extra dimension for black people that it does not have
for whites. We are suffering doubly." The NAACP also
went on record by passing a resolution opposing the war
0 2
"Another Emergency Escalation," New York Times,
14 February 1968, sec. 1, p. 46.
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likened to King's plan.
King had renewed his attack on the United States foreign
policy in Vietnam in February of 1967 and by August of 1967,
public support of the war dropped from 72 percent to 61
percent and the number to continue the fight "to get a
69
negotiated peace" dropped from 57 percent to 37 percent.
Then, in March of 1968, the Gallup Poll revealed that 49
percent of the population believed that the United States
. . . . . 70
military involvement in.Vietnam was wrong.
It is hard to determine whether King had an impact on
the change of attitude toward the war or not because there
were many other significant factors that contributed to the
home front's disapproval. But one must admit that he was a
forerunner of a unpopular trend that gained increased public
support.
6 8
Aptheker, AfrO’-American History; The Modern Era,
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CONCLUSION
As a disciple of nonviolence and a Christian minister/
King thought it was best to use the weapon of nonviolence
to settle the conflict in Vietnam. However, he opposed the
war not solely on the grounds of nonviolence which did play
an important role in;his opposition, but also on the basis
of his total philosophy which included moral, philosophical,
and theological concepts.
King objected to the United States' involvement for a
variety of reasons. (He carefully observed the many dis¬
turbing effects thereof). He viewed the war as a contro¬
versial issue which did not allow the Vietnamese the right
of self-determination as set forth by the Geneva Accord
Agreements. The war was also a blatant violation of' the
United Nations' Charter, which maintained that its members
should refrain from the use of force against territorial
integrity of any state. He sincerely felt that each nation
should undergo the same growing pains of civil war that so
many other nations experience to reach their maturity and
independence. In attempting to impede the revolution in
Vietnam, the United States became the anti-revolutionary
force in not letting other nations which disagreed with its
ideology of democracy have its own form of government. This
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type of revolutionary spirit displayed by the United States
was antithical to its early beginnings in 1776. King/
perhaps, believed that had the United States listened to the
proposals of Ho Chi Minh in 1945 when he proclaimed the
independence of Vietnam, Vietnam would not have travelled
the road of communism.
King felt that because of its pursuit of the war, the
government was not investing the necessary funds in domestic
programs for the poor at home, resulting in the failure of
the poverty program which would have helped both black and
white. However, the war had a more damaging effect on the
black poor than any other group. Blacks were dying in
considerable disproportionate numbers in a country 8,000
miles away to protect the Vietnamese from communism, yet
these same blacks did not have certain civil rights and
economic priviledges as whites at home. For King, blacks
were losing on both fronts: more blacks were bearing the
brunt of being killed and, at the same time, losing out on
the war, on poverty.
In King's speaking out against the United States foreign
policy, along with his participation in peace rallies, he
practices his philosophy in its fullest dimension; it ,
severely bothered his conscience that he was helping America
resolve its internal problems nonviolently while, at the same,
time, the United States was using violence in solving its
external problems in Vietnam. This was a strange inconsistency
73
that he would not accept, particularly when blacks of the
North advised by King to be nonviolent reminded him of the
governments' usage of violence to solve its problems. To
have subscribed to such an inconsistency, he would have
been philosophically and theologically hypocritical. He had
discovered that nonviolence, with the principle of love, was
a powerful weapon for solving problems at home. And, in
fact, he was now urging his country to use this method of
finding a solution to its problems abroad in Vietnam.
King also opposed the war because of its threat to man¬
kind's survival. The major powers had the resources to
destroy each other. And if the United States continued
fighting in Vietnam, China could have been expected to engage
in the war, followed by the Soviet Union which could have
brought about World War III.
Of course. King opposed the war on other grounds, such
as the arrogance of the United States in thinking it was
predestined to police the entire world; and the attack on the
right to dissent at home. King also objected to the war
because it strengthened reactionary forces at home - it gave
those anti-forces, anti-labor, anti-black anti-hiimanist, and
extremists. - a weapon of spurious patriotisms to galvanize
its supporters into reaching for power right up to the White
House.
King was ahead of most people in the realization of the
detriments of the war, and the criticisms he received was
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unwarranted. Those who criticized him/ perhaps/ did more
harm to the civil rights movement than did King's speaking
out against the war. And in a sense/ he was prophetic in
that others/ before his death/ began to oppose the war and
realized the truth of what he was trying to tell them.
Many did not see the connection between the war and the civil
rights movement and simply refused to reproach the govern¬
ment's foreign policy in fear of losing public support for
civil rights legislation. With this in mind/ one must admit
that King was extremely courageous to go against his country's
policy in Vietnam/ particularly when his stand was so un¬
popular at first.
King/ in opposing the war/ was more than a Civil Rights
leader. Many assumed that civil rights was his cause and
to get involved in the peace issue was to diminish his
influence. His total philosophy took him far beyond the
cause of civil rights for a certain group to human rights
for all. In other words/ his philosophy was transcended
beyond a particular race/ a particular class/ and a
particular nation. Thus/ he did not only experience an
intellectual growth from civil rights to human rights/ he
had experienced an intellectual growth from a nationalist
to an internationalist. He was interested not only in the
neighborhood of nations but also in the brotherhood of man.
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